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Abstract Given the recent successes of Deep Learning in AI there has been increased
interest in the role and need for explanations in machine learned theories. A distinct
notion in this context is that of Michie’s definition of Ultra-Strong Machine Learning
(USML). USML is demonstrated by a measurable increase in human performance of
a task following provision to the human of a symbolic machine learned theory for
task performance. A recent paper demonstrates the beneficial effect of a machine
learned logic theory for a classification task, yet no existing work has examined
the potential harmfulness of machine’s involvement in human learning. This paper
investigates the explanatory effects of a machine learned theory in the context of
simple two person games and proposes a framework for identifying the harmfulness
of machine explanations based on the Cognitive Science literature. The approach
involves a cognitive window consisting of two quantifiable bounds and it is supported
by empirical evidence collected from human trials. Our quantitative and qualitative
results indicate that human learning aided by a symbolic machine learned theory
which satisfies a cognitive window has achieved significantly higher performance
than human self learning. Results also demonstrate that human learning aided by a
symbolic machine learned theory that fails to satisfy this window leads to significantly
worse performance than unaided human learning.
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2 Lun Ai et al.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper [34] the authors provided an operational definition for comprehensi-
bility of logic programs and used this, in experiments with humans, to provide the
first demonstration of Michie’s Ultra-Strong Machine Learning (USML). The authors
demonstrated USML via empirical evidence that humans improve out-of-sample per-
formance in concept learning from a training set E when presented with a first-order
logic theory which has been machine learned from E. The improvement of human
performance indicates a beneficial effect of comprehensible machine learned models
on human skill acquisition. The present paper investigates the explanatory effects
of machine’s involvement in human skill acquisition of simple games. Our results
indicate that when a machine learned theory is used to teach strategies to humans,
in some cases the human’s out-of-sample performance is reduced. This degradation of
human performance is recognised to indicate the existence of harmful explanations.
In the current paper, which extends our previous work on the phenomenon of
USML, both beneficial and harmful effects of a machine learned theory are explored in
the context of simple games. Our definition of explanatory effects is based on human
out-of-sample performance in the presence of natural language explanation generated
from a machine learned theory (Figure 1). The analogy between understanding a
logic program via declarative reading and understanding a piece of natural language
text allows the explanatory effects of a machine learned theory to be investigated.
Fig. 1: Textual and visual explanations are shown to treated participants along with
a training example for winning a two player game isomorphic to Noughts and Crosses.
Textual explanations were generated from the rules learned by our Meta-Interpretive
exPlainable game learner MIPlain.
The results of relevant Cognitive Science literature allow the properties of a
logic theory which are harmful to human comprehension to be characterised. Our
approach is based on developing a framework describing a cognitive window which
involves bounds with regard to 1) descriptive complexity of a theory and 2) execution
stack requirements for knowledge application. We hypothesise that a machine learned
theory provides a harmful explanation to humans when theory complexity is high
and execution is cognitively challenging. Our proposed cognitive window model is
confirmed by empirical evidence collected from multiple experiments involving human
participants of various backgrounds.
We summarise our main contributions as follows:
– We define a measure to evaluate beneficial/harmful explanatory effects of machine
learned theory on human comprehension.
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– We develop a framework to assess a cognitive window of a machine learned theory.
The approach encompasses theory complexity and the required execution stack.
– Our quantitative and qualitative analyses of the experimental results demonstrate
that a machine learned theory has a harmful effect on human comprehension
when its search space is too large for human knowledge acquisition and it fails to
incorporate executional shortcuts.
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we discuss existing work relevant
to the paper. The theoretical framework with relevant definitions is presented in
Section 3. We describe our experimental framework and the experimental hypotheses
in Section 4. Section 5 describes several experiments involving human participants on
two simple games. We examine the impact of a cognitive window on the explanatory
effects of a machine learned theory based on human performance and verbal input. In
Section 6, we conclude our work and comment on our analytical results – only a short
and simple-to-execute theory can have a beneficial effect on human comprehension.
We discuss potential extensions to the current framework, curriculum learning and
behavioural cloning, for enhancing explanatory effects of a machine learned theory.
2 Related work
This section summarises related research of game learning and familiarises the reader
with the core motivations for our work. We first present a short overview of related
investigations in explanatory machine learning of games. Subsequently, we cover
various approaches for teaching and learning between humans and machines.
2.1 Explanatory machine learning of games
Early approaches to learning game strategies [47,41] used the decision tree learner ID3
to classify minimax depth-of-win for positions in chess end games. These approaches
used carefully selected board attributes as features. However, chess experts had
difficulty understanding the learned decision tree due to its high complexity [26].
Methods for simplifying decision trees without compromising their accuracy have
been investigated [42] on the basis that simpler models are more comprehensible to
humans. An early Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) [35] approach learned optimal
chess endgame strategies at depth 0 or 1 [5]. An informal complexity constraint was
applied which limits the number of clauses used in any predicate definition to 7± 2
clauses. This number is based on the hypothesised limit on human short term memory
capacity of 7 ± 2 chunks [29]. A different approach involving the augmentation of
training data with high-level annotations was explored in [18]. Initialisation requires
explanations to be provided for the target data set and the predicative accuracy of
explanations is evaluated similarly to the predicative accuracy of labels.
The earliest reinforcement learning system MENACE (Matchbox Educable
Noughts And Crosses Engine) [25] was specifically designed to learn an optimal agent
policy for Noughts and Crosses. Later, Q-Learning [54] and Deep Reinforcement
Learning were spawned and have led to a variety of applications including the
Atari 2600 games [33] and the game of Go [50]. While these systems defeated the
strongest human players, they are not human-like since they lack the ability to
explain the encoded knowledge to humans. Recent approaches such as [55] have
aimed to explain the policies learned by these models, but the learned strategy is
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implicitly encoded into the continuous parameters of the policy function which makes
their operation opaque to humans. Relational Reinforcement Learning [14] and Deep
Relational Reinforcement Learning [56] have attempted to address these drawbacks
by incorporating the use of relational biases to ensure human understandability.
In [30,31], the author provided a survey of most relevant work in explainable AI
and argued that explanatory functionalities were mostly subjective to the developer’s
view. While there is a general lack of demonstration on explanatory effect which
should be examined by empirical trials, no existing framework accounts for the
explanatory harmfulness of machine learned models.
2.2 Two-way learning between human and machine
As an emerging sub-field of AI, Machine Teaching [16] provides an algorithmic model
for quantifying the teaching effort and a framework for identifying an optimized
teaching set of examples to allow maximum learning efficiency for the learner. The
learner is usually a machine learning model of a human in a hypothesised setting. In
education, machine teaching has been applied to devise intelligent tutoring systems
to select examples for teaching [59,43]. On the other hand, rule-based logic theories
are important mechanisms of explanation. Rule-based knowledge representations are
generalised means of concept encoding and have a structure analogous to human
conception. Mechanisms of logical reasoning, induction and abduction, have long
been shown to be highly related to human concept attainment and information
processing [23,19]. Additionally, humans’ ability to apply recursion plays a key role
in understanding of relational concepts and semantics of language [17] which are
important for communication.
The process of reconstructing implicit target knowledge which is easy to operate
but difficult to describe via machine learning has been explored under the topic of
Behavioural Cloning. The cloning of human operation sequence has been applied in
various domains such as piloting [28] and crane operation [53]. The cloned human
knowledge and experience are more dependable and less error-prone due to perceptual
and executional inconsistency being averaged across the original behavioural trace. To
our knowledge, no existing work has attempted to estimate human errors and target
these mistakes in interactive teaching sessions for achieving a measurable "clean up"
effect [27] from machine explanations.
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Meta-interpretive learning of simple games
Meta-Interpretive Learning (MIL) [37,38] is a sub-field of ILP which supports pred-
icate invention, dependent learning [24], learning of recursions and higher-order
programs. Given an input (B,M, E+, E−) where the background knowledge B is a
first-order logic program, meta-rulesM are second-order clauses, positive examples
E+ and negative examples E− are ground atoms, a MIL algorithm returns a logic
program hypothesis H such thatM ∪H ∪ B |= E+ andM ∪H ∪ B 6|= E−. The
meta-rules (for examples see Figure 3) contain existentially quantified second-order
variables and universally quantified first-order variables. They clarify the declarative
bias employed for substitutions of second-order Skolem constants. The resulting
first-order theories are thus strictly logical generalisation of the meta-rules.
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Table 1: A set of win rules is learned by MIGO. MIGO’s background knowledge
contains a general move generator move/2 and a won classifier won/1 to encode the
minimum rules of the game. The program is dyadic and win_1/2 can be reduced to
win_1(A,B) : −move(A,B), won(B) by removing literals after unfolding.
Depth Rules
1 win_1(A,B):- win_1_1_1(A,B),won(B).
win_1_1_1(A,B):-move(A,B),won(B).
2 win_2(A,B):-win_2_1_1(A,B),not(win_2_1_1(B,C)).
win_2_1_1(A,B):-move(A,B), not(win_1(B,C)).
3 win_3(A,B):-win_3_1_1(A,B),not(win_3_1_1(B,C)).
win_3_1_1(A,B):-win_2_1_1(A,B), not(win_2(B,C)).
Table 2: The logic program learned by MIPlain represents a strategy for the first
player to win at different depths of the game. The predicate win_3_4/1 can be
reduced to win_3_4(A) : −win_2(A,B) by removing literals after unfolding.
Depth Rules
1 win_1(A,B):-move(A,B),won(B).
2 win_2(A,B):-move(A,B),win_2_1(B).
win_2_1(A):-number_of_pairs(A,x,2), number_of_pairs(A,o,0).
3 win_3(A,B):-move(A,B),win_3_1(B).
win_3_1(A):-number_of_pairs(A,x,1),win_3_2(A).
win_3_2(A):-move(A,B),win_3_3(B).
win_3_3(A):-number_of_pairs(A,x,0),win_3_4(A).
win_3_4(A):-win_2(A,B),win_2_1(B).
The MIL game learning framework MIGO [36] is a purely symbolic system based
on the adapted Prolog meta-interpreter Metagol [12]. MIGO learns exclusively from
positive examples by playing against the optimal opponent. MIGO is provided with a
set of three relational primitives, move/2, won/1, drawn/1 which are a move generator,
a won and a drawn classifier respectively. These primitives represent the minimal
information a human would expect to know before playing a two-person game. For
Noughts and Crosses and Hexapawn, MIGO learns a rule-like symbolic game strategy
(Table 1) that supports human understanding and was demonstrated to converge
using less training data compared to Deep and classical Q-Learning. For successive
values of k, MIGO learns a series of inter-related definitions for predicates win_k/2.
These predicates define maintenance of minimax win in k-ply.
We introduce MIPlain1, a variant of MIGO which focuses on learning the task
of winning for the game of Noughts and Crosses. In addition to learning from positive
examples, MIPlain identifies moves which are negative examples for the task of
winning. When a game is drawn or lost for the learner, the corresponding path in
the game tree is saved for later backtracking following the most updated strategy.
MIPlain performs a selection of hypotheses based on the efficiency of hypothesised
programs using Metaopt [13].
An additional primitive number_of_pairs/3 is provided to MIPlain which
depicts the number of pairs for a player (X or O) on a given board. A pair is the
alignment of two marks of one player, the third square of this line being empty.
An example of pairs is shown in Figure 2. This additional primitive serves as an
executional shortcut that reduces the depth of the search when executing the learned
1 MIPlain source is available at https://github.com/LAi1997/MIPlain
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Fig. 2: O has two pairs
represented in green and
X has no pairs.
Meta-rule
P (A,B)← Q(A,B), R(B).
P (A)← Q(A,B), R(B).
P (A)← Q(A,S, T ), R(A).
P (A)← Q(A,S, T ), R(A,U, V ).
Fig. 3: Letters P, Q, R, S, T, U, V denote existen-
tially quantified second-order variables and A, B,
C are universally quantified first-order variables.
strategy. Furthermore, MIPlain is given the meta-rules described in Figure 3, which
are two variants of the postcon meta-rule with monadic or dyadic head, and two
variants of the conjunction meta-rule with currying in either the first or both body
literals. Currying allows the learning of programs with higher-arity predicates where
existentially quantified argument variables are bound to constants. The learned
strategy presented in Table 2 describes conditions in a rule-like manner that the
player’s optimal move has to satisfy.
3.2 Explanatory effectiveness of a machine learned theory
We extend the machine-aided human comprehension of examples in [34] and C(D,H,E)
denotes the unaided human comprehension of examples where D is a target definition,
H is a group of humans and E is a set of examples. Based on the analogy between
declarative understanding of a logic program and understanding of a natural language
explanation, we describe measures for estimating the degree to which the output of a
symbolic machine learning algorithm as an explanation can aid human comprehension.
Definition 1 (Machine-explained human comprehension of examples,
Cex(D,H,M(E))): Given a definition D, a group of humans H, a theory M(E)
learned using machine learning algorithm M and examples E, the machine-explained
human comprehension of examples E is the mean accuracy with which a human
h ∈ H after brief study of an explanation based on M(E) can classify new material
selected from the domain of D.
Definition 2 (Explanatory effect of a machine learned theory, Eex(D,H,M(E))):
Given a definition D, a group of humans H, a symbolic machine learning algorithm
M , the explanatory effect of the theory M(E) learned from examples E is
Eex(D,H,M(E)) = Cex(D,H,M(E))− C(D,H,E)
Definition 3 (Beneficial/harmful effect of a machine learned theory): Given
a definition D, a group of humans H, a symbolic machine learning algorithm M :
– M(E) learned from examples E is beneficial to H if Eex(D,H,M(E)) > 0
– M(E) learned from examples E is harmful to H if Eex(D,H,M(E)) < 0
– Otherwise, M(E) learned from examples E does not have observable effect on H
In the scope of this work, we relate the explanatory effectiveness of a theory
to performance which means that a harmful explanation provided by the machine
degrades comprehension of the task and therefore reduces performance.
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3.3 Cognitive window of a machine learned theory
In this section, we suggest a window of a machine learned theory that constraints its
explanatory effectiveness. A basic assumption of cognitive psychology and artificial
intelligence is that human information processing can be modelled in analogy to
symbol manipulation of computers – respectively its formal characterisation of a
Turing Machine [29,21,39]. More specifically, computational models of cognition share
the view that intelligent action is based on manipulation of representations in working
memory. In consequence, human inferential reasoning is limited by working memory
capacity which corresponds to limitations of tape length and instruction complexity
in Turing Machines.
Besides general restrictions of human information processing, performance can be
influenced by internal or environmental disruptions such that the given competencies
of a human in a specific domain are not always reflected in observable actions [11,49].
However, it can be assumed that humans – at least in domains of higher cognition
– are able to explain their actions by verbalising the rules which they applied to
produce a given result [46]. Although rules in general can be classified as procedural
knowledge, the ability to verbalise rules makes them part of declarative memory [3,
46]. For complex domains, the rules which govern action generation will typically be
computationally complex as measured by the Kolmogorov complexity [22]. One can
assume that increase in complexity can have a negative effect on performance.
In language processing and in general problem solving, hierarchisation of complex
action sequences can make information processing more efficient. Typically, a general
goal is broken down into sub-goals as it has been proposed in production system
models [39] as well as in the context of analogical problem solving [9]. Rules which
guide problem solving behaviour, for instance in puzzles such as Tower of Hanoi or
games such as Noughts and Crosses, might be learned. From a declarative perspective,
such learned rules correspond to explicit representations of a concept such as the win-
in-two-steps move introduced above. Studies of rule-based concept acquisition suggest
that human concept learning can be characterised as search in a pool of possible
hypotheses which are explored in some order of preference [8]. This observation relates
to the concept of version space learning introduced in machine learning [32].
Based on these different observations concerning human information processing,
we propose that a) human learners are version space learners with limited hypothesis
space search capability that use meta-rules to learn sub-goal structure and primitives
as background knowledge. This allows us to compute a bound on the human hypothesis
space size based on the MIL complexity analysis in [24]. We assume that b) rules
can be represented explicitly in a declarative, verbalisable form. Finally, we postulate
the existence of a cognitive window such that a machine learned theory can be an
effective explanation if it satisfies two constraints: 1) a hypothesised human learning
procedure which has a limited search space and 2) a knowledge application model
based on the Kolmogorov complexity [22]. For the following definitions, we restrict
ourselves to learning datalog programs which do not include function symbols.
Definition 4 (Cognitive bound on the hypothesis space size, B(P,H)): Con-
sider a symbolic machine learned datalog program P using p predicate symbols and
m meta-rules each having at most j body literals. For a group of humans H, B(P,H)
is a bound on the size of hypothesis space such that at most n clauses in P can be
comprehended by H and B(P,H) = mnp(1+j)n.
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When learned knowledge is cognitively challenging, execution overflows human
working memory and instruction stack. We then expect decision making to be more
error prone and the task performance of human learners to be less dependable. To
account for the cognitive complexity of applying a machine learned theory, we define
the cognitive resource of a logic term and atom.
Definition 5 (Cognitive cost of a logic term and atom, C(T )): Given T a
logic term or atom, the cost of C(T ) can be computed as follows:
– C(>) = C(⊥) = 1
– A variable V has cost C(V ) = 1
– A constant c has cost C(c) which is the number of digits and characters in c
– A list [T1, T2, ...] as a data structure used by MIGO and MIPlain has cost
C([T1, T2, ...]) = C(T1) + C(T2)+ . . .
– An atom Q(T1, T2, ...) has cost C(Q(T1, T2, ...)) = 1 + C(T1) + C(T2)+ . . .
Example 1 The Noughts and Crosses position in Figure 2 is represented by an array
[e, x, o, e, e, x, o, e, o], where e is an empty field and o and x are marks on the board.
It has cognitive cost C([e, x, o, e, e, x, o, e, o]) = 9.
Note that we compute cognitive costs of programs without redundancy since
repeated literals in programs learned by MIGO and MIPlain were removed after
unfolding for generating explanations which are presented to human populations.
Also, a game position can be represented by different data types. We ignore the cost
due to implementation and only count digits and marks.
Example 2 An atom win_2([e, x, o, e, e, x, o, e, o], X) with variable X has a cognitive
cost C(win_2([e, x, o, e, e, x, o, e, o], X)) = 11.
We model the inferential process of evaluating training and testing examples
by the run-time execution stack of a datalog program. The resolution of a query
represents a mental application of a piece of knowledge given a training or testing
example. In this work, we neglect the cost of computing the sub-goals of a primitive
and compute its cost as if it were a normal predicate for simplicity.
Example 3 A primitive move(S1, S2) which is an atom with variables S1 and S2 has
a cognitive cost C(move(S1, S2)) = 3.
Definition 6 (Execution stack of a datalog program, S(P, q)): Given a query
q, the execution stack S(P, q) of a datalog program P is a set of atoms or terms
evaluated during the execution of P to compute q. Each exit point of the execution
is replaced with the value >, and each backtrack point has the value ⊥.
Definition 7 (Cognitive cost of a datalog program, Cog(P, q)): Given a query
q, and let St represent S(P, q), the cognitive cost of a datalog program P is
Cog(P, q) = min
St
∑
t∈St
C(t)
Example 4 The primitive move/2 outputs a valid Noughts and Crosses state from
a given input game state; the query is move(s1, B). The execution stack contains
move(s1, B) and move(s1, s2), Cog(P,move(s1, B)) is 10.
S(move(A,B), move(s1, B)) move(s1, B) move(s1, s2) >
C(T) 4 5 1
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The maintenance cost of task goals in working memory affects performance of
problem solving [10]. Background knowledge provides key mappings from solutions
obtained in other domains or past experience [4,40] and grants shortcuts for the
construction of the current solution process. We expect that when knowledge that
provides executional shortcuts is comprehended, the efficiency of human problem
solving could be improved due to a lower demand for cognitive resource. Contrarily,
in the absence of informative knowledge, performance would be limited by human
operational error and would not be better than solving the problem directly. To
account for the latter case, we define the cognitive cost of a problem solution that
involves the minimum amount of information from the task.
Definition 8 (Minimum primitive solution program, M¯φ(E)): Given a set of
primitives φ and examples E, a datalog program learned from examples E using a
symbolic machine learning algorithm M¯ and a set of primitives φ′ ⊆ φ is a minimum
primitive solution program M¯φ(E) if and only if for all sets of primitives φ′′ ⊆ φ
where |φ′′| < |φ′| and for all symbolic machine learning algorithm M ′ using φ′′, there
exists no machine learned program M ′(E) that is consistent with examples E.
Given a machine learning algorithm M using primitives φ and examples E, a
minimum primitive solution program M¯φ(E) is learned by using the smallest subset
of φ such that M¯φ(E) is consistent with E. A minimum primitive solution program is
defined to not use more auxiliary knowledge than necessary but does not necessarily
have the minimum cognitive cost over all programs learned with examples E.
Remark 1 Given that the training examples of Noughts and Crosses are winnable and
MIPlain uses the set of primitives φ = {move/2, won/1, number_of_pairs/3}, a
minimum primitive solution program is produced by MIGO. This is because MIGO
uses primitives {move/2, won/1} which is a strict subset of φ for making a move and
deciding a win when the input is winnable. Primitives move/2 and won/1 are also
the necessary and sufficient primitives to win Noughts and Crosses and no theory
can be learned using a subset of φ with the cardinality of one.
Definition 9 (Cognitive cost of a problem solution, CogP (E, φ, q)): Given
examples E, primitive set φ and a query q, the cognitive cost of a problem solution is
CogP (E, φ, q) = min
M¯
Cog(M¯φ(E), q)
where M¯φ(E) is a minimum primitive solution program.
Remark 2 The program P learned by MIPlain has less cognitive cost than the one
learned by MIGO except for queries concerning win_1/2. Given sufficient examples
E and primitive set used by MIPlain, φ = {move/2, won/1, number_of_pairs/3},
based on Definition 6 to 9, we have Cog(P, x1) = CogP (E, φ, x1), Cog(P, x2) <
CogP (E, φ, x2) and Cog(P, x3) < CogP (E, φ, x3) where xi = wini(si, V ) in which
si represents a position winnable in i moves and V is a variable.
We give a definition of human cognitive window based on theory complexity
during knowledge acquisition and theory execution cost during knowledge application.
A machine learned theory has 1) a harmful explanatory effect when its hypothesis
space size exceeds the cognitive bound and 2) no beneficial explanatory effect if its
cognitive cost is not sufficiently lower than the cognitive cost of the problem solution.
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Table 3: Criteria for evaluating verbal responses and examples for category win_2/2.
Q(r) Criteria Exemplary r
Level 0 r does not fit into any of the categories
below
“Follow the instructions.”
Level 1 One or more primitives in the machine
learned theory, directly or by synonyms,
are described correctly in r
“This move gives me a pair.”
Level 2 All primitives in the machine learned
theory, directly or by synonyms, are de-
scribed correctly in r
“I should have picked this move to pre-
vent the opponent and get two attacks.”
Level 3 r is unambiguous and follows a matching
executional order as the machine learned
theory
"This move gives me two attacks and
prevents the opponent from getting a
pair."
Level 4 r explains one or more primitives in the
machine learned theory in correct causal
relations
“This is a good move because by making
two pairs and blocking the opponent,
the opponent cannot win in one turn
and can only block one of my pairs.”
Definition 10 (Cognitive window of a machine learned theory): Given a
definition D, a symbolic machine learning algorithm M , examples E, M(E) is a
machine learned theory using the primitive set φ and belongs to a program class with
hypothesis space S. For a group of humans H, Eex satisfies
1. Eex(D,H,M(E)) < 0 if |S| > B(M(E), H) and
2. Eex(D,H,M(E)) ≤ 0 if Cog(M(E), x) ≥ CogP (E, φ, x) for queries x that h ∈ H
have to perform after study
4 Experimental framework
In the following section, we describe an experimental framework for assessing the
impact of cognitive window on the explanatory effects of a machine learned theory.
Our experimental framework involves 1) a set of criteria for evaluating the participants’
learning quality from their own verbal descriptions of learned strategies and 2) an
outline of experimental hypotheses. For game playing, we assume humans are able to
explain actions by verbalising procedural rules of strategy. We expect verbal responses
to provide insights about human decision making and knowledge acquisition. The
quality of verbal responses can be affected by multiple factors such as motivation,
familiarity with the introduced concepts and understanding of the game rules. We
take into account these factors in the evaluation criteria.
Definition 11 (Primitive coverage of a verbal response): A verbal response
correctly describes a primitive if the semantic meaning of the primitive is unambigu-
ously stated in the response. The primitive coverage is the number of primitives in a
symbolic machine learned theory that are described correctly in a verbal response.
Definition 12 (Quality of a verbal response, Q(r)): A verbal response r is
checked against the specifications from Table 3 in an increasing order from criteria
level 1 to level 4. Q(r) is the highest level i that r can satisfy. When a response does
not satisfy any of the higher levels, the quality of this response is the lowest level 0.
To illustrate, we consider the predicate win_2/2 learned by MIPlain (Table 2).
Primitive predicates are move/2 and number_of_pairs/3. We present in Table 3
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a number of examples of verbal responses. A high quality response reflects a high
motivation and good understanding of game concepts and strategy. On the other hand,
a poor quality response demonstrates a lack of motivation or poor understanding.
Definition 13 (High (HQ) / low (LQ) quality verbal response): A HQ re-
sponse rh has Q(rh) ≥ 3 and a LQ response rl has Q(rl) < 3.
We define the following null hypotheses to be tested in Section 5 and describe
the motivations. Let M denote a symbolic machine learning algorithm. E stands
for examples, D is a target definition, H is a group of participants sampled from
a human population. M(E) denotes a machine learned theory which belongs to a
definite clause program class with hypothesis space S. First, we are interested in
demonstrating whether 1) the verbal response quality of learned knowledge reflects
comprehension, 2) there exist cognitive bounds for humans to provide verbal responses
of higher quality and 3) the machine learned theory helps improve the quality of
verbal responses.
H1: Unaided human comprehension C(D,H,E) and machine-explained human com-
prehension Cex(D,H,M(E)) manifest in verbal response quality Q(r). We ex-
amine if high post-test accuracy correlates with high response quality and high
primitive coverage of each question category.
H2: Difficulty for human participants to provide verbal response increases with quality
Q(r). We examine if the proportion of verbal responses reduces with respect to
high response quality and high primitive coverage of each question category.
H3: Machine learned theoryM(E) improves verbal response quality Q(r). We examine
if machine-aided learning results in more HQ responses.
The impact of a cognitive window on explanatory effects is tested via the following
hypotheses. φ is a set of primitives introduced to H. Let x denote the set of questions
that human h ∈ H answers after learning.
H4: Learning a complex theory (|S| > B(M(E), H)) exceeding the cognitive bound
leads to a harmful explanatory effect (Eex(D,H,M(E)) < 0). We examine if the
post-test accuracy, after studying a machine learned theory that participants
cannot recall fully, is worse than the accuracy following self-learning.
H5: Applying a theory without a low cognitive cost (Cog(M(E), x) ≥ CogP (E, φ, x))
does not lead to a beneficial explanatory effect (Eex(D,H,M(E)) ≤ 0). We
examine if the post-test accuracy, after studying a machine learned theory that
is cognitively costly, is equal to or worse than the accuracy following self-learning.
5 Experiments
This section introduces the materials and experimental procedure which we designed
to examine the explanatory effects of a machine learned theory on human learners.
Afterwards, we describe the experiment interface and present experimental results.
5.1 Materials
We assume that Noughts and Crosses is a widely known game a lot of participants of
the experiments are familiar with. This might result in many participants already
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Table 4: Summary of experiment parts. Participants played one mock game against a
random computer player for the more difficult Island Game. After selecting a move in
training and regardless of its correctness, participants received the labels of the two
moves presented; treated participants additionally received explanations generated
fromMIPlain’s learned program. We introduced the primitive set used byMIPlain.
Part Participant’s assignment No. Question format
Intro Understand rules to move and
win
1 practice
Pre-test Choose the optimal move 15 five canonical positions each for
win_1, win_2 & win_3
Training Understand the concept of
pairs; choose the optimal move
and reflect on the choice
9 two choices each for win_1, win_2
& win_3; presentation of the labels
Post-test Choose the optimal move 15 five canonical positions each for
win_1, win_2 & win_3; Rotated
and flipped from pre-test questions.
Open ques-
tions
Describe the strategy of a pre-
viously made move
6 Questions requiring verbal response
Survey Provide gender, age group &
education level
3 multiple choices
playing optimally before receiving explanations, leaving no room for potential per-
formance increase. In order to address this issue, the Island Game was designed as
a problem isomorphic to Noughts and Crosses. [51] define isomorphic problems as
"problems whose solutions and moves can be placed in one-to-one relation with the
solutions and moves of the given problem". This changes the superficial presentation
of a problem without modifying the underlying structure. Several findings imply
that this does not impede solving the problem via analogical inference if the original
problem is consciously recognized as an analogy; on the other hand, the prior step
of initially identifying a helpful analogy via analogical access is highly influenced
by superficial similarity [15,20,44]. Given that the Island Game presents a major
re-design of the game surface, we expect that participants will less likely recall prior
experience of Noughts and Crosses that would facilitate problem solving, leading to
less optimal play initially and more potential for performance increase.
The Island Game (Figure 4) contains three islands, each with three territories on
which one or more resources are marked. The winning condition is met when a player
controls either all territories on one island or three instances of the same resource.
The nine territories resemble the nine fields in Noughts and Crosses and the structure
of the original game is maintained in regard to players’ turns, possible moves, board
states and win conditions. This isomorphism masks a number of spatial relations that
represent the membership of a field to a win condition. In this way, the fields can be
rearranged in an arbitrary order without changing the structure of the game.
5.2 Methods and design
Fig. 4: Example of pre- and post-test ques-
tion for the Island Game. A board is pre-
sented to the participant who has to select
the move that he or she thinks is optimal.
We use two experiment interfaces, one
for Noughts and Crosses and another
one for the Island Game. For both, we
adopt a two-group pre-test post-test de-
sign (Table 4). In the pre-test, perfor-
mance of participants in both self learn-
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ing and machine-aided learning groups
are measured in an identical way. Dur-
ing training, we introduce to participants
the concept of pairs and they are able to
see correct answers of some game po-
sitions. In the post-test, performance
of both self-learning and machine-aided
groups are evaluated in the exact same
way as in the pre-test. This experiment setting allows to evaluate the degree of change
in performance as the result of explanations. Each question in pre- and post-test is
the presentation of a board for which it is the participant’s turn to play. They are
asked to select what they consider to be the optimal move. A question category of
wini denotes a game position winnable in i moves of the human player. An exemplary
question is shown in the Figure 4. The post-test questions are rotated and flipped
from pre-test questions. In each test, only 15 questions are given to limit experiment
duration to one hour. The response time of participants was recorded for each pre-test
and post-test question.
The treatment was applied to the machine-aided group. In the interest of exper-
imentation, during treatment, we present both visual and textual explanations to
avoid unnecessary effort of participants to associate textual explanations to game
positions and concepts. This is based on the consideration that direct association
between textual explanations and game states which can be abstract for participants
who are not familiar with the designed game domain. Learned first-order theories
have been translated with manual adjustments based on primitives provided to all
participants and to MIPlain. An exemplary explanation is shown in Figure 1. Both
visual and textual explanations preserve the structure of hypotheses to account for
the reasons that make a move right and the other move wrong. Conversely, during
training, the self-learning group was presented with similar game position without
the corresponding visual and textual explanations. For the Island Game experiments,
we recorded an English description of the strategy they used for each of the selected
post-test questions. Participants are presented previously submitted answers, one at a
time along with a text input box for written answers. Moves for these open questions
are selected from post-test with a preference order from wrong and hesitant moves
to consistently correct moves. We associate hesitant answers with higher response
times. A total of six questions are selected based on individual performance during
the post-test.
5.3 Experiment results
We conducted three experiments2 using the interface with Noughts and Crosses
questions and explanations. These experiments were carried out on three samples:
an undergraduate student group from Imperial College London, a junior student
group from a German middle school and a mixed background group from Amazon
Mechanical Turk3 (AMT). No consistent explanatory effects could be observed for
any of the mentioned samples. The problem solving strategy that humans apply can
be affected by factors such as task familiarity, problem difficulty, and motivation. For
2 raw data are available upon request from the authors
3 AMT is a online crowdsourcing platform which we used to recruit experiment samples
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(a) Mixed background self learning and
machine-aided learning.
(b) Student self learning and machine-aided
learning.
Fig. 5: Number of correct answers in pre- and post-test with respect to question
categories.
instance, [45] suggested that a rather superficial analogical transfer of a strategy is
applied when a problem is too difficult or when there is no reason to gain a more
general understanding of a problem. Given that the majority of subjects achieved
reasonable initial performance, we ascribe the reason of such results to experience
with the game and complexity of explanations. The game familiarity of adult groups
led to less potential for performance improvement. Early middle school students had
limited attention and were overwhelmed by information intake. Alternatively, we
focused on specially designed experiment materials in the following experiments.
5.3.1 Island Game with open questions
A sample from Amazon Mechanical Turk and a student sample from the University
of Bamberg participated in experiments2 that used the interface with Island Game
questions and explanations. To test hypothesesH1 toH5, we employed a quantitative
analysis on test performance and a qualitative analysis on verbal responses. A sub-
sample with a mediocre initial performance within one standard deviation of the
mean was selected for the performance analysis. This aims to discount the ceiling
effect (initial performance too high) and outliers (e.g. struggling to use the interface).
From AMT sample, we had 90 participants who were 18 to above 65 years old.
A sub-sample of 58 participants with a mediocre initial performance was randomly
partitioned into two groups, MS (Mixed background Self learning n = 29) and MM
(Mixed background Machine-aided learning, n = 29). A different sub-sample of 30
participants completed open questions and was randomly split into two groups, MSR
(Mixed background Self learning and strategy Recall, n = 15) and MMR (Mixed
background Machine-aided learning and strategy Recall, n = 15). As shown in Figure
5a, in category win_2, MM post-test had a better comprehension (p = 0.028) than
MS post-test while MM and MS had similar pre-test performance (p > 0.1) in
this category. Results in category win_2 indicate that explanations have a beneficial
effect on MM. However, MM did not have a better comprehension on win_1 than
MS given the same initial performance (p > 0.1). In addition, MM had the same
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initial performance as MS on win_3 (p > 0.1) but MM’s performance reduced after
receiving explanations of win_3 (p = 0.005).
From a group of students involved in a Cognitive Systems course at the University
of Bamberg, we had 13 participants who were 18 to 24 years old and a few outliers
between 25 and 54 years. All participants were asked to complete open questions and
were randomly split into two groups, SSR (Student Self learning and strategy Recall,
n = 4) and SMR (Student Machine-aided learning and strategy Recall, n = 9). A
sub-sample of 9 with a mediocre initial performance was randomly divided into SS
(Student Self learning, n = 2) and SM (Student Machine-aided learning, n = 7). The
imbalance in the student sample was caused by a number of participants leaving
during the experiment. The machine-aided learning results show large performance
variances in post-test as evidence for insignificant levels of performance degradation.
In Table 5, we identified that participants who were able to provide high quality
responses for their test answers scored higher on these questions. This is not the
case for win_3, however, due to the high difficulty of providing good description
of strategy for win_3 category. Additionally, in the win_2 category, both machine-
aided groups (MMR: 2/(2+35), SMR: 9/(9+14)) have greater proportions of high
quality responses than self learning groups (MSR: 1/(1+32), SSR: 1/(1+8)). Also,
we observed a pattern in which there are less HQ responses than LQ responses in
win_1 and win_2 categories. This pattern is more significant in win_2 category.
Figure 6 illustrates the difficulty of providing good quality verbal response for the
non-trivial category win_3. Since win_1 contains only two predicates, we examined
primitive coverage of non-trivial categories win_2 and win_3. However, for clarity
of presentation, we only show category win_3 which has more remarkable trends.
When counting primitives based on Definition 11, we only consider the constraint
number_of_pairs/3 and ignore the move generator move/2 as participants were
required to make a move when they answered a question.
In Figure 6a, we plotted primitive coverage against the accuracy of post-test
answers that were selected as open questions. We observed a major monotonically
increasing trend in accuracy with respect to primitive coverage. This indicates that
high matching between verbal responses and the machine learned theory correlates
with high performance. In Figure 6b, we observed downward curves for MSR and
MMR in the number of verbal responses from the lower to the higher primitive
coverage. More responses were provided by SSR and SMR covering one primitive
than MSR and MMR. Participants gave very few responses that cover more than
two primitives. Based on the learned theory in Table 2, the results suggest an
Table 5: The number and accuracy of HQ and LQ responses for groups MSR, MMR,
SSR, SMR and each question category. For win_3, the most mentally challenging
category of all three, no HQ response was given.
win_1 win_2 win_3
MSR No. HQ / post-train accuracy 9 / 0.889 1 / 1.0 -
No. LQ / post-train accuracy 19 / 0.421 32 / 0.406 29 / 0.517
MMR No. HQ / post-train accuracy 8 / 1.00 2 / 1.00 -
No. LQ / post-train accuracy 16 / 0.250 35 / 0.486 29 / 0.483
SSR No. HQ / post-train accuracy 6 / 1.00 1 / 1.00 -
No. LQ / post-train accuracy 0 / 0.00 8 / 0.750 9 / 0.667
SMR No. HQ / post-train accuracy 9 / 1.00 9 / 0.778 -
No. LQ / post-train accuracy 3 / 0.00 14 / 0.571 19 / 0.737
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(a) The accuracy of verbal responses in-
creases with respect to the number of prim-
itives covered.
(b) The proportion of quality verbal re-
sponses decreases with respect to the num-
ber of primitives covered.
Fig. 6: win_3 reuses win_2 and uses four number_of_pairs/3 when unfolded. In
Figure 6b, both mixed background groups (MSR and MMR) had lower proportions
of responses covering one predicate than student groups (SSR and SMR). Mixed
background and student groups could not provide a significant proportion of response
covering more than one and two primitives respectively (Figure 6a).
Table 6: Hypotheses concerning quality of verbal responses and comprehension.
C stands for confirmed, N denotes not confirmed, H stands for hypothesis. Test
outcomes are presented for win_1, win_2 and win_3 categories.
H win_1 win_2 win_3
H1 Human comprehensions manifest in verbal response quality C C C
H2 Difficulty for human participants to provide verbal response
increases with verbal response quality
C C C
H3 Machine learned theory improves verbal response quality N C N
increasing difficulty to provide more complete strategy descriptions beyond two
(mixed background groups) and four (student groups) clauses of win_3.
5.4 Discussion
Results concerning null hypotheses H1 to H5 are summarised in Table 6 and 7. First,
we assume that (H1 Null) comprehension does not correlate with verbal response
quality. Results of HQ responses in two categories (Table 5) suggest that being able to
provide better verbal responses of strategy corresponds to a high comprehension. We
also examined the coverage of primitives (specifically for LQ responses of win_3) in
verbal responses (Figure 6a). Evidence in all categories shows a correlation between
comprehension and the degree of verbal response matching with explanations. We
reject the null hypothesis in all categories which implies the confirmation of H1.
In addition, we assume that (H2 Null) the difficulty for human participants to
provide verbal response is not affected by verbal response quality. Since high response
quality is difficult to achieve (Table 5) and it is challenging to correctly describe all
primitives (Figure 6b), we reject this null hypothesis for all categories and confirm H2
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Table 7: Hypotheses concerning cognitive window and explanatory effects. C stands
for confirmed, H stands for hypothesis, T stands for test outcome.
H T
H4 Learning a complex theory exceeding the cognitive bound leads to a harmful
explanatory effect
C
H5 Applying a learned theory without a low cognitive cost does not lead to a beneficial
explanatory effect
C
as it is increasingly difficult for participants to provide higher quality verbal response.
Hence, two additional trends we observed from the same figure suggest two mental
barriers of learning. As we assume a human sample is a collection of version space
learners, the search space of participants is limited to programs of size two (mixed
background groups) and four (student groups). When H is taken as the student
sample and P to be the machine learned theory on winning the Island Game, the
cognitive bound B(P,H) = m4 ∗ p4(j+1) = 44 ∗ 212 corresponds to the hypothesis
space size for programs with four clauses (four metarules are used with at most two
body literals in each clause, primitives are move/2 and number_of_pairs/3).
Furthermore, we assume that (H3 Null) machine learned theory does not improve
verbal response quality. Results (Table 5) show higher proportion of HQ responses for
machine-aided learning than self-learning in category win_2. Thus, for win_2, we
reject this null hypothesis which means H3 is confirmed in category win_2 where the
machine explanations result in more high quality verbal responses being provided.
We assume that (H4 Null) learning a descriptively complex theory does not affect
comprehension harmfully. When P is the program learned by MIPlain, B(P,H) for
two samples correspond to program class with size no larger than 4. Only win_3 which
has a larger size of seven after unfolding exceeds these cognitive bounds. As harmful
effects (Figure 5a and 5b) have been observed in category win_3, this null hypothesis
is rejected and H4 is confirmed as learning a complex machine learned theory has a
harmful effect on comprehension. We also assume that (H5 Null) applying a theory
without a sufficiently low cognitive cost has a beneficial effect on comprehension.
Given that the predicate win_1 in MIPlain’s learned theory does not have a low
cognitive cost, we reject this null hypothesis since no significant beneficial effect
has been observed. This null hypothesis is therefore rejected and we confirm H5 –
knowledge application requiring much cognitive resource does not result in better
comprehension.
The performance analysis (Figure 5a) demonstrates a comprehension difference
between self learning and machine-aided learning in category win_2. An explanatory
effect has not been observed for the student sample. While the conflicting results
suggest that a larger sample size would likely ensure consistency of statistical evidence,
the patterns in results suggest more significant results in category win_2 than win_1
and win_3. The predicate win_2 in the program learned by MIPlain satisfies both
constraints on hypothesis space bound for knowledge acquisition and cognitive cost
for knowledge application. In addition, the cognitive window explains the lack of
beneficial effects of predicates win_1 and win_3. The former does not have a lower
cognitive cost for execution so that operational errors cannot be reduced, thus there
has been no observable effects. The latter is a complex rule with a larger hypothesis
space for human participants to search from and harmful effects have been observed
due to partial knowledge being learned.
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win_1(A,B):-move(A,B),
win_1_1(B).
win_1_1(A):-number_of_pairs(A,x,1),
number_of_pairs(A,x,1).
Fig. 7: Left: participant’s chosen move from the initial position in Figure 4. Right:
Metagol one-shot learns from participant’s move a program representing his strategy.
The learned program denotes strategy of finding a pair rather than going for a direct
win, which is a mismatch between taught and learned knowledge.
6 Conclusions and further work
While the focus of explainable AI approaches has been on explanations of clas-
sifications [1], we have investigated explanations in the context of game strategy
learning. In addition, we have explored both beneficial and harmful sides of the AI’s
explanatory effect on human comprehension. Our theoretical framework involves a
cognitive window to account for the properties of a machine learned theory that
lead to improvement or degradation of human performance. The presented empir-
ical studies have shown that explanations are not helpful in general but only if
they are of appropriate complexity – being neither informatively overwhelming nor
more cognitively expensive than the solution to a problem itself. It would appear
that complex machine learning models and models which cannot provide abstract
descriptions of internal decisions are difficult to be explained effectively. However,
we acknowledge the limitation of our empirical studies in terms of consistency of
statistical evidence as groups vary greatly in sample size which might be addressed
with further experimentation.
To explain a strategy, typically goals or sub-goals must be related to actions
which can fulfill these goals. If the strategy involves to keep in mind a stack of open
sub-goals – as for example the Tower of Hanoi [2,46] – explanations might become
more complex than figuring out the action sequence. Based on [8], knowledge is
learned by humans in an incremental way, which was recently emphasized by [58] on
human category learning. A potential approach to improve explanatory effectiveness
of a machine learned theory is to process complex concepts into smaller chunks by
initially providing simple-to-execute and short sub-goal explanations. Mapping input
to another sub-goal output thus consumes lower cognitive resources and improvement
in performance is more likely. It is worth investigating for future work a teaching
procedure involving a sequence of teaching sessions that issues increasingly difficult
tasks and explanations. Abstract descriptions might be generated in the form of
invented predicates as it has been shown in previous work on ILP as an approach
to USML [34]. An example for such an abstract description for the investigated
game is the predicate number_of_pairs/3. Therefore, learning might be organised
incrementally, guided by a curriculum [6,52].
In addition, the current teaching procedure, which only specifies humans as
learners, could be augmented to enable two-way learning between human and machine.
Human decisions might be machine learned and explanations would be provided based
on estimation of human errors during the course of training. A simple demonstration
of this idea is presented in Figure 7. We would like to explore, in the future, an
interactive procedure in which a machine iteratively re-teaches human learners by
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targeting human learning errors via specially tailored explanations. [7] suggested it is
crucial for machine produced clones to be able to represent goal-oriented knowledge
which is in a form that is similar to human conceptual structure. Hence, MIL is an
appropriate candidate for cloning since it is able to iteratively learn complex concepts
by inventing sub-goal predicates. We hope to incorporate cloning to predict and
target mistakes in human learned knowledge from answers in a sequence of re-training.
We expect a "clean up" on operation errors of human behaviours from empirical
experiments by presenting appropriate explanations in re-training. Such corrections
and improvements guided by identified errors in a human strategy are also helpful in
the context of intelligent tutoring [57] where classic strategies such as algorithmic
debugging [48] can be applied to make humans and machines learn from each other.
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